TRUST AS A COGNITIVE DECISION UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF NOISE AND BIAS

Abstract

The article examines trust as a cognitive decision that enables readiness to act under uncertainty and risk at both the individual and institutional levels. The theoretical framework is grounded in dual-process models of thinking, in which System 1 generates rapid intuitive judgments of reliability, while System 2 can potentially provide control, verification, and correction when sufficient attentional resources, time, and motivation are available. It is argued that the quality of trustrelated decisions substantially depends on two types of error in human judgment–bias and noise. Bias is shown to involve a systematic substitution of evidence with readily available cues (status, confidence, attractiveness, processing fluency, familiarity), producing predictable distortions in trust in oneself and in institutions. Noise, in turn, is described as random variability in evaluations under identical conditions, associated with contextual factors and the decision-maker’s state (fatigue, stress, order effects, priming), which undermines the consistency and predictability of decisions. It is demonstrated that institutional trust critically relies on two signals–decision consistency (low noise) and procedural impartiality (low bias); weakening of these signals increases perceived risk and promotes distrust as an adaptive strategy. The article proposes procedural guidelines for reducing noise and bias in high-stakes decisions through standardized criteria, independence of judgments, structured protocols, verification tools, and monitoring of variability and systematic skew.